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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the impact of financial leverage on firm performance measured by 
ROA and ROE in publicly traded enterprises amongst the selected emerging markets, 
including Brazil, Russia, India and China. Additionally, the study also examines the 
association of debt equity choice with firm efficiency during a period of extreme distress 
which is noticeably thought-provoking when considering the emerging markets since debt 
markets were concerned to trigger for the financial crisis of 2008 penetrating the emerging 
economies.  
This study employs data on large, publicly listed companies from the four largest emerging 
economies including Brazil, Russia, India and China in the period from 2003 to 2013 to 
observe the effect of financial leverage on firm performance. The thesis investigates whether 
firm performance is affected by debt equity choice and this relationship if exists persists the 
same during economic downturns or periods of extreme distress. 
Empirical results reveals that financial leverage has significantly negative impact on firm 
performance in tested markets. However, during economic turbulence, this relationship varies 
from countries to countries. While China and India show that the link is more adverse during 
recessions, Brazil witnesses a contrary picture when higher level of debt facilitates firm 
performance during economic downtrends. Russia suggests insignificant relationship between 
leverage and firm performance measured by both ROA and ROE. Concerning firms 
experiencing financial distress, the test provides mixed results amongst economies.  
 
KEYWORDS: financial leverage, firm performance, emerging markets, level of debt, capital 
structure.  
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I- INTRODUCTION 
 
Debt financing has assumed a critical importance in a firm‟s choice of its capital structure. 
Aiming at maximizing its value, the firm is unrestricted to reach the choice of debt or equity 
in its capital structure. Therefore, it provokes a vexed question to many managers how to 
finance firms‟ overall operations, from issuing shares to increase equity, from short-term 
debt, from long-term debt, or a combination of debt and equity. In other words, what is the 
optimal capital structure for a firm to reach its ultimate goal? 
 
It is over fifty years since Modigliani and Miller set a remarkable milestone in corporate 
finance with their theorem about cost of capital. Modigliani and Miller (1958) suggested that 
the capital structure of a firm does not affect to its market value based on assumptions that 
there is no corporate taxes, no agency cost, homogeneous investors‟ expectations of future 
cash flows, and efficient market for bonds and stocks. The underlying reason is that there is 
no benefit to borrowing due to no interest liability. As a result, firm would be indifferent to 
the source of capital. Five years later, in American Economic Association, Modigliani and 
Miller (1963) addressed the tax issue profoundly in their study. When taxes are included, the 
optimal capital structure might be complete debt finance due to advantage of using debt over 
equity as a source of capital since interest payment on the debt or cost of debt is exempted 
from corporate taxes. Consequently, firms could generate higher profit after tax by 
substituting debt for equity. More specifically, the firm value would increase by the interest 
tax shield (the marginal tax rate times debt). Additionally, Jeremias (2008) proposed an 
explanatory theory of maximizing use of debt, in which debt financing not only grants the 
benefit of tax advantage but also improves efficiency since high level of debt imposes 
constraints to firms. By contrast, Phillips and Sipahioglu (2007) suggested that low levels of 
debt constitute maximizing the firm value.  
 
However, when concerning costs of financial distress in modern corporate finance, which are 
costs incurred in inability to meet firm‟s obligations including direct costs such as legal and 
administrative costs of liquidation or reconstruction, and indirect costs like loss of sales, 
impaired ability to obtain financing, or agency cost, it is difficult to determine the optimal 
capital structure. If financial distress is more costly than the benefit of using debt then firms 
with higher leverage will experience the greatest operating hazards in recession. Conversely, 
if financial distress reinforces firms by pushing efficient operating changes, which results in 
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more benefits than the costs of financial distress then higher levered firms will perform better 
than firms with less debt. Previous work of Opler et al. (1994) has investigated this for U.S. 
firms and found out that companies with more debt tend to lose market share in economic 
downturn.  
 
The literature regarding the association of firm performance and the choice between debt and 
equity is immense; however, empirical evidence yields inconsistent results (Margaritis and 
Psillaki, 2010; Chathoth et al., 2007; Berger et al., 2006). It is thus crystal clear that firm 
financing decisions are rather intricate procedures and existing studies can only explain some 
certain facets of the entanglement of financing choices.  
 
1.1.The purposes and hypotheses  
 
This thesis aims to address the question of firm‟s efficiency associated with its financial 
leverage under international context to see whether the relationship between level of debt and 
firm performance is homogeneous across countries. Specifically, in this paper the data on 
publicly traded enterprises in the largest emerging economies, including Brazil, Russia, India 
and China (BRIC) over the period 2003-2013 are used to examine. In addition, the thesis also 
investigates the association of financial leverage with firm performance during a period of 
extreme distress in those countries. This matter is noticeably intriguing when considering the 
emerging markets since it was controverted that through debt markets the financial crisis of 
2008 penetrated the emerging economies. Thus, the following hypotheses will be tested in 
this paper:  
 
Hypothesis 1:  the financial leverage affects firm performance in the selected emerging 
markets.  
 
This hypothesis indicates that the choice of debt and equity affects firm‟s efficiency if the 
relationship is tested significantly. The question is how it affects the firm performance, 
positively or negatively. It also brings the next issue whether this relationship is still 
significant during economic recessions. The second hypothesis thus is examined as   
 
Hypothesis 2: during economic downturn, the financial leverage significantly affects firm 
performance in the selected emerging markets.  
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It also raises an issue concerning costs of financial distress in modern corporate finance when 
costs incurred is inability to meet firm‟s obligations, it is difficult to determine whether more 
debt or less debt is better for firm performance. This as a result proposes the final hypothesis 
as 
Hypothesis 3: the financial leverage has more significant impact on performance of 
financially distressed firms than of financially non-distressed firms.  
 
 
1.2.Contribution of the thesis 
 
This thesis aims to make several distributions to the existing literature. First, instead of 
focusing on a specific period, it investigates the link between firm performance and capital 
structure in a longer time span including the financial crisis period. This approach thus allows 
us to examine the impact of leverage on firm performance in both ordinary economics state 
and financial turmoil. Second, the thesis also considers the endogeneity problem, which 
emanates from reverse causality since profitable firms may prefer to higher level of debt. 
Finally, while determinants of the choice regarding capital structure under developed 
economies are well documented, the effects of level of debt on firm value in developing 
economies still remain somewhat ambiguous. This thesis thus aims to contribute to the 
literature by examining relationship between the choice of capital structure and firm 
performance in the largest emerging markets. Besides emerging markets as lucrative 
destinations for business expansion along with the saturation of developed markets, they 
provide a particular interesting context for investigating the impact of choice of debt and 
equity on firm performance since the emerging markets is different from developed 
economies regarding the firm behavior towards debt financing. In developed markets, firms 
are prone to persist in a particular type of debt; conversely, the choice of debt source in 
emerging markets is more dynamic. Firms in these markets may switch from public debt to 
private debt, which has a significant effect on choice of debt and equity. That in turn may 
create a more pronounced impact on firm performance.  
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1.3. Structure of the study  
 
The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the literature review 
related to relationship between firm performance, capital structure and financial distress. 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical background. Chapter 4 outlines the database, methodology 
and main variables. Chapter 5 discusses empirical models and results. Chapter 6 draws 
conclusion of the thesis.  
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II- LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Many previous studies has investigated if there is any relationship between firm performance 
and capital structure and if exists, whether this association is negative or positive. These 
papers have provided mixed results.  
 
On one hand, it has been argued that firm performance is positively influenced by its level of 
leverage. It is explained that higher level of debt forces managers to maximize the value of 
firm and reduces manager discretions. This idea is derived from the agency cost theory where 
the interests of shareholders and managers are not ideally aligned. Debt might makes 
contribution into managing corporate agency conflicts since it is easier for shareholders to 
adjust debt ratio rather than to modify share of capital. Hubert de La Bruslerie et al. (2012) 
study French firms to support the idea that there exists an inverted U-shape relationship 
between level of debt and shareholder‟s ownership. Jensen et al. (1976) gave particular 
attention to the effect of agency cost resulted from conflict of shareholders and managers‟ 
interests, where managers tend to act in pursuit of maximizing their utilities. Free cash flow 
theory developed by Jensen (1986) has emphasized the disciplinary role of debt when higher 
level of debt reduced managers to invest in projects below cost of capital due to the pressure 
to generate cash flows to offset the debt liability. This is also consistent to several studies, 
such as Stulz (1990) and Grossman et al. (1982). Another possible reason is suggested by 
Modigliani and Miller (1963). When considering taxes, the optimal capital structure may be 
total debt finance due to tax advantage. The interest payment on the debt is excluded from tax 
liability. Thus, firms could gain higher earnings after tax by substituting debt for equity. 
Grossman and Hart (1982) also argued that if firms experienced financial distress and 
bankruptcy is costly for managers then higher level of debt could provide further incentives 
for manager to work more diligently and reduce managerial discretions. These findings 
indicate that regardless of bankruptcy costs, high leverage can add more value for firms.  
 
According to Graham et al. (2015), unregulated US firms substantially increased their 
leverage ratio over the past century. The aggregate leverage from 1945 to 1970 more than 
tripled compared to before 1945, from 11% to 35% and reached 47% by the early 1990s. If in 
1946, the median company had no debt, then in 1970, it had 31% total debt in their capital 
structure. Roden et al. (1995) has studied the capital structure in 48 U.S. companies from 
1981-1990 and found out that higher levered companies perform better. Ghosh et al. (2000) 
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and Champion (1999) have also suggested the similar resutls, corporations with higher level 
of debt have efficient productivity. Victor (2013) has analyzed the effect of financial leverage 
on firm performance across countries to examine whether this effect varies from countries to 
countries. He has studied 10,375 firms in 39 countries and revealed that the effect of leverage 
on firm performance depends on the legal origin, the financial structure and development of 
countries. Regarding legal origin, the result has showed that in French civil law countries, 
highly levered firms perform better even when being suffered from economic downturn. This 
implies that the role of debt is predominant factor to reduce manger discretion. Related to 
agency cost problem, Jirapon and Gleason (2007) has studied the relationship between capital 
structure and shareholder rights and suggested the inverse association between them, which 
means that firms adopt higher leverage where strength of shareholder rights is restricted. 
Athur Korteweg (2010) also estimated the net benefits to leverage using panel data in the 
period from 1994 to 2004 and found that net benefits to debt are escalating for firms with low 
levels of debt but diminishing when very high level of debt. This implies that there is an 
existence of optimal capital structure. In this paper, he also pointed out net benefits can 
amount to 5.5% of firm value for the median firm in his sample. This means that if the firm 
reaches its optimal capital structure, its value can be worth 5.5% more than the value of the 
firm with no debt in its capital structure.  
 
On the other hand, many debates around this relationship have been provoked. Myers (1977) 
has indicated that tax savings benefited by debt do not result in preference to higher leverage 
adopted by firms. Companies maintain „reserve borrowing capacity‟ according to Modigliani 
and Miller (1963) and that there exists the law of diminishing returns when the tax 
increments reduce advantage of borrowings since higher level of debt is used, less certain the 
tax shields become. They also notice the personal taxes, which will alleviate the theoretical 
tax advantage of firm debt. Indeed, Miller (1977) has proposed a model in which tax 
advantage is totally irrelevant. Myers (1977) explains why it is rational for firms to restrict 
level of debt, even when there is a considerable tax advantage and capital markets are 
perfectly efficient by assuming that „most companies are valued as going concerns and that 
this value reflects an expectation of continued future investment by the firm‟. He also 
assumes that this investment is non-mandatory. The amount of investment depends on the net 
present values of future economic benefits it brings with. As a result, the firm value is 
affected by options to make further investments. Myers has pointed out that highly levered 
firms that act to maximize stockholders‟ value will implement a different decision rule from 
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ones that issue no debt. More risky debt outstanding decreases the firm value by adopting a 
suboptimal future strategy. More specifically, the existence of debt may alleviate firm‟s 
incentive to make optimal future investments. Thus, the optimal capital structure is a tradeoff 
between tax advantage of debt and costs of pursuing the suboptimal future investments.  
 
 It is also a subject of argument that financial distress is more costly than the benefits of debt 
and is a determinant of capital structure. While the direct costs incurred in financial distress 
are estimated as relatively small by many empirical evidences contributed by Altman et al. 
(2006) and Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), the indirect costs incurred are more significant. 
Opler and Titman (1994) has suggested that costs due to insufficient ability to obtain 
financing or loss of sale considerably affect to firm performance. The expected cost of 
financial distress is proportional with higher level of debt firms adopt since it may impulse 
managers to make decisions that are detrimental to creditors, and stakeholders. As a result, 
financial leverage has an inverse influence on firm performance. Kester (1986) has revealed a 
negative relationship between capital structure and firm performance with the sample of U.S. 
and Japanese companies. Similar findings have been documented by Arbabian and Safari 
(2009), Wald (1999) and Titman et al. (1988). Mahfuzah (2012) has carried out investigation 
in the sample of 237 Malaysian companies listed on the Bursa Malaysia main board to 
explore the relationship between capital structure and firm performance. The empirical 
results have revealed that capital structure has a negative impact on firm performance 
measured by ROE and ROA but when firm efficiency is measured by Tobin‟ Q, it shows the 
reverse true. Tobin‟Q has a positive relationship with short term debt and long term debt at 
critical level. Alternatively, Majumdar and Chibber (1999) have pointed out that high levels 
of debt have negative impact on firm performance. In their study, they observed that while 
firm size, diversity, liquidity and inventory positively affect firm performance, age and 
industrial grouping have adverse impact on the corporate value. In the same vein, Gleason et 
al. (2000) studied firms in 14 European countries and found that there is a negative 
relationship between capital structure and firm performance.  
 
However, firm performance in turn might also have an impact on choice of capital source. 
Berger and Bonarccosi di Patti (2006) has indicated that more efficient firms tend to generate 
higher earnings for a specific capital structure, which in turn is considered as buffer against 
portfolio risk. Consequently, they might be able to substitute equity to debt in their capital 
structure. This lays foundation for the efficiency risk hypothesis, more profitable firms 
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incline to choose more debt outstanding since high efficiency means lower costs of 
bankruptcy and financial distress. Conversely, it has been argued that firms that expect to 
maintain their good performance in the future would consider lower leverage to preserve the 
economic rents or ‟franchise value‟ obtained by these efficiencies from the threat of 
liquidation, according to Demsetz (1973) and Berger et al. (2006). Thus, under the franchise 
value hypothesis, more efficient companies would prefer hoding more equity or lower level 
of debt in their capital structure due to income effect. Margaritis and Psillaki (2010) has 
analyzed this relationship and found out that more efficient firms incline to choose higher 
leverage due to lower expected costs of liquidation and financial distress. Chaiporn 
Vethessonthi et al. (2015) find out that the impact of financial leverage on operating 
performance is non-static and conditional on firm size. Specifically, they suggest for small 
companies, there is a positive relationship between leverage and firm performance but large 
firms show opposite link. Also Johnny Jermias (2008) indicates that this relationship is 
conditional on competitive intensity and business strategy. He confirms that cost of debt is 
higher for firms following product differentiation strategy than cost leadership strategy; as a 
result, competitive intensity negatively affects the leverage-performance association.  
 
Since the empirical results vary from companies to companies and are affected by many other 
factors such as characteristics of firms, industry and countries, it is worth studying and 
examining how level of debt adopted by firms affects to their performance. Since there are 
many studies conducting research in this relationship in developed countries, this paper tests 
the relationship between the financial leverage and firm performance in emerging markets to 
see how is the impact of financial leverage to firm efficiency. Is the result drawn similar to 
previous works in developed countries? 
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III- THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
3.1 Traditional theories and optimal capital structure 
 
3.1.1. Traditional theories 
The traditional theories of capital structure primarily deal with the cost of capital, in which 
the market value of a company is generally determined by discounted the stream of future 
cash flows. A corporate finances its operating activities by raising money from shareholders 
or lenders. If it collects cash from shareholders, it is defined as equity financing. Its 
shareholders get no fixed return but instead, they receive a percentage of firm earnings 
depending on the fraction of capital they put in the firm, or dividend. The equity financing 
can be raised in two ways by issuing new shares of stock or retaining earnings. Otherwise, 
the firm can finance its activities by borrowing from lenders. Under this circumstance, it has 
to pay a fixed rate of interest and return the debt also. There are two sources of debt financing 
the firm can obtain, which are private debt and public debt. A firm‟s combination of debt and 
equity financing is called its capital structure.  
    The conventional theorems of capital structure fundamentally devote attention to the costs 
of debt and equity. Let‟s denote rA is expected return on assets, which is defined as the ratio 
of the expected operating income and the total market value of firm‟s securities. Suppose that 
an investor finances all the firm‟s equity and holds all of the firm‟s debt so he is entitled to 
generate all the firm‟s income. Thus the expected return of his investments is equal rA. It is 
known that the expected return on a portfolio is the weighted average of the expected returns 
on the individual holding. The expected return of the investor, according to Brealey, Myers, 
and Allen 2011: 425-430 therefore is equal to  
rA = (proportion in debt x expected return on debt) + (proportion in equity x expected return 
on equity) or  
rA= (
𝐷
𝐷+𝐸 
 x rD) + (
𝐸
𝐷+𝐸
 x rE) , where 
D is the firm‟s debt 
E is the firm‟s equity  
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RE and RD is the expected return on equity and expected return on debt respectively;   
The optimal capital structure is the mix of debt and equity where the weighted average cost 
of capital (WACC) is minimized, based on the research on capital structure conducted by 
Modigliani and Miller in 1958. The combination of equity and debt can be illustrated by the 
figure below, according to Brealey et al. (2011). They assumed that the cost of equity is often 
higher than the cost of debt so an increase in debt financing or borrowing at first can bring 
down the total cost of capital. However, excessive level of debt causes more risk for 
shareholders due to imposing heavier burden on paying interest payments, which in turn 
reduces shareholder‟s wealth and may increase possibility of financial distress. To offset the 
risk shareholders hold, the cost of equity is required to increase, which increase WACC or in 
other words, WACC is upward sloping. The relationship thus between level of debt financing 
and WACC is irrelevant making the optimal capital structure somewhat hypothetical.  
Brealey et al. (2011) argues that there are many benefits when using the weighted average 
cost of capital approach to make a decision of cost of capital of a firm. It is a remarkable 
straightforward approach to confront an intractable problem. This approach employs a 
rational and logical methodology and is easily calculated, which may give rationale for its 
widespread acceptance by firms. Also this approach promptly responds to altering 
components of capital structure since it is built upon debt and equity. Minor changes in the 
capital structure, such as changes in the cost of debt or retained earnings will be manifested in 
corresponding adjustments in the overall cost of capital. Moreover, the weighted average cost 
of capital approach generates satisfactory results when the firm borrows at a normal or 
acceptable level of debt. This method however has received some criticisms. The most 
challenging thing probably arises when firms need to figure the marginal cost of capital with 
new projects and financing decisions. In this circumstance, the computed required return is 
employed in the new proposals. This causes the possibility that two firms with same size with 
different capital structures probably make different decisions on the same project. If the 
project is lucrative with regards of risk and return, it should be accepted to both firms.  
Second, this approach is incapable of dealing with low profits. If a firm is facing with a 
period of low returns, the weighted average cost of capital will be imprecise. For example, if 
the cost of equity of a firm is 2% then it does not mean that it can accept projects at 2 % or 
higher. As experiencing such a low profits, the market value of the stock demonstrates either 
a liquidation value or speculation for future. This drives its shareholders to attempt pursuing 
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higher returns in another place. Therefore, if a firm is not attaining adequate profits compared 
to other firms, then the weighted average cost of capital approach will be inaccurate.  
 Finally, this method fails to tackle firms with extreme low-cost debt. Short-term debt is a 
crucial source for firms with financial distress. If the short-term liability is   under payable 
account, it will not include in financing charges. If a firm heavily accounts for zero-cost or 
low-cost short-term liability then the overall cost of capital will be low. And if the firm 
employs this rate to determine required return rate, it will be inaccurate. Thus a firm that has 
large amount of short-term liabilities may apply a high return ratio. To maintain long-term 
liabilities in an attempt to minimize the risk and short-term liabilities, firms need to generate 
high profits.    
The evolution of the optimal capital structure theory began with Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) who set a remarkable milestone in corporate finance with their theorem about cost of 
capital. They suggest that the capital structure of a firm does not affect to its market value 
based on assumptions that there is no corporate taxes, no agency cost, homogeneous 
investors‟ expectations of future cash flows, and efficient market for bonds and stocks. The 
underlying reason is that there is no benefit to borrowing due to no interest liability. The 
benefits of lower cost of debt are offset entirely by an increase in the cost of equity, which 
makes capital structure decisions irrelevant to the firm value. As a result, firm would be 
indifferent to the source of capital. The MM‟s argument that “choice of debt and equity is 
irrelevant is a perfect application of the law of conservation of value”, Modigliani and Milller 
(1958). That is if we have two streams of cash flow, A and B, then “the present value of the 
sum of A +B is equal to the sum of present value of each stream cash or PV of A + PV of B”. 
Regarding to MM‟s proposition I, it is suggested that firm value is determined by real assets, 
which are on the left-hand side of the balance sheet, not by the proportion of debt and equity 
issued to buy those assets. In other words, under the perfect market assumption, the choice of 
debt and equity is irrelevant when the firm value is the total of real assets. Alternatively, 
Proposition I might be expressed as Modigliani and Miller in a following formula:  
Vmkt= EBIT/K0, where  
Vmkt is the market value of firm 
EBIT is the earnings before interest and tax  
K0 is the average cost of capital  
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From this above formula, it is clear that Proposition I implies that the average cost of capital 
of any firm is irrelevant to its capital structure. Continuing their initial proposition, Miller and 
Modigliani study that the expected return of a share of stock is the sum of capitalization rate 
K0 and a premium associated with the financial risk. The premium is calculated as the 
leverage ratio times the difference between K0 and Ki. This can be expressed in formula as:  
Ke= K0 + (K0 – Ki) x debt-equity ratio, where  
Ke is cost of equity  
Ki is the interest rate for debt  
In Proposition II, they focus on the impacts of financial leverage. Noticeably, the spread 
between K0 and K1 is the spread between the cost of capital and the returns on this capital. 
When a firm lowers its level of debt by offsetting an equivalent amount of equity, Modigliani 
and Miller claim that „the total value of the firm remains unchanged, but the cost of equity 
rises since shareholders in a levered firm are expecting a higher return‟. Proposition II thus 
addresses itself the impact of financial leverage, that is to increase earnings for shareholders 
rather than to grow the firm value.  
Proposition III of Modigliani and Miller suggests that the lowest point from investment for a 
firm is the average cost of capital, K0 and this is irrelevant to the type of security used to 
finance that investment. This conclusion holds the same view with the capital asset model, in 
which the investments should be made on or above the market line.  
These above propositions of Miller-Modigliani however have faced several criticisms. One 
argues that the perfect markets are rather theoretical; they do not always exist indeed. 
Investors are sometimes intuitive, not always rational and firms do not always access 
sufficient information to make decisions. All capital markets are widely believed to have 
experienced inefficient periods implying arbitrage opportunities for some individuals and 
institutions. They exploit advantage of asymmetric information to identify discrepancies 
between intrinsic value and market value of assets.   
Secondly, the Miller-Modigliani model is too simple since it does not take transaction costs 
into consideration. These costs have a significant impact on arbitrage opportunities. This 
prohibits investors to undertake arbitrage. Regarding this argument, there are some debates 
provoked. The presence of financial intermediaries with transaction costs eliminated 
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facilitates institutions and investors to purchase and sell securities to achieve their goal. One 
of the fiercest criticisms however may be that Miller and Modigliani ignored bankruptcy cost. 
They assumed that in a perfect market, a zero bankruptcy cost exists, which means that if a 
firm fails to run its business it can liquidate by undertaking sales of total assets at their market 
values without any legal or administration fees. In fact, if there is any threat to firm 
insolvency, firms with high level of debt possibly become less attractive to investors. This 
assumption thus is particularly restrictive since when a firm experiences financially distressed 
period, the legal costs for administering the liquidation are extremely huge. Paolo Giordani et 
al. (2011)  argues that the higher level of debt a firm use, the higher possibility of bankruptcy 
the firm faces as illustrated in the below figure.  
As shown in Figure 2, there is a non-linear relationship between level of debt and likelihood 
of bankruptcy. Last but not least, the most severe criticism perhaps lies in the failure to 
assume the corporate income taxes. Since taxes are calculated after interest is subtracted, the 
use of debt is less costly than equity financing, which could lead to an increase in total value 
of the firm.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between level of leverage and likelihood of bankruptcy 
Later, Modigliani and Miller (1963) present another theorem, in which the tax issue is 
addressed profoundly. When taxes are included, the optimal capital structure might be 
complete debt finance due to the advantage of using debt over equity as a source of capital 
since interest payment on the debt or cost of debt is exempted from corporate taxes. 
Percent 
Leverage 
ratio 
Possibility of 
bankruptcy 
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Consequently, firms could generate higher profit after tax by substituting debt for equity. 
More specifically, the firm value would increase by the interest tax shield (the marginal tax 
rate times debt). Therefore, it implies that the firm value is maximized when the firm entirely 
finances by borrowing. In reality, however, this proposition is not sound since an increase in 
interest payments due to higher leverage to a certain point is likely to exceed the benefits of 
tax shield according to the law of diminishing returns, which might lead to an increase in cost 
of debt. Furthermore, Modigliani & Miller did not consider several indirect costs such as 
agency costs, bankruptcy costs or asymmetric information.  
Indeed, Miller (1977) proposed a model in which tax advantage is totally irrelevant. He 
notices that the personal taxes will alleviate the theoretical tax advantage of firm debt. He 
argues that the taxes on shareholders‟ dividend completely reverse the benefit of tax 
exemptions from firm debt, which implies that firm-specific optimal capital structure is 
virtually illusionary in equilibrium.  
3.1.2. Optimal Capital Structure  
The optimal capital structure for a firm is the combination between debt and equity financing 
to achieve the maximum value of the firm‟s common stock in the marketplace. According to 
Brealey et al. (2011), if a firm finances its business by increasing level of debt; thereby 
increases the value of common stock then this kind of borrowing causes the firm to move 
towards the optimal capital structure point. Vice versa, if the firm‟s increase in level of debt 
financing leads to a decrease in the value of common stock then this action moves the firm 
away from its optimal point. The optimal capital structure is a point maximizing both the 
value of the firm and the value of common stock. This point based on the study of Brealey et 
al. (2011) can be expressed as:  
Vmax = Dmkt + PSmkt + CS mkt (max) , where              (1)  
Dmkt is the level of debt of the firm  
PSmkt is the preferred stock of the firm  
CSmkt is the common stock of the firm  
Take a closer at this equation (1), it is clear that to maximize the value of the firm, the firm 
should consider maximizing the value of common stock of the firm. To see the rationale 
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behind this equation, the level of debt and the preferred stock of the firm is first taken into 
consideration. For a profitable firm, for example, the payments of interest for liabilities and 
dividends on fixed-return securities are steady and not likely to vary in the market in response 
to changes in profit of the firm. These two first components in the formula (1) instead 
fluctuate significant when there are substantial changes in interest rates of debt and preferred 
stock yield.  
Therefore, under capital structure management, the firm value is maximized when the value 
of common stock is maximized. Secondly, it is noticed that the value of common stock is 
maximized on a per-share basis. A firm thus could increase its value by issuing additional 
securities. If this kind of financing however causes the reverse, then the firm moves away 
from its optimal point. As a result, maximizing the common stock value is recognized to 
maximize on a per-share basis. Finally, when determining the optimal point in capital 
structure, the levels of required return for the firm, K0 and the shareholders, Ke should be 
concerned. These sections below will examine the optimal capital structure under the 
traditional theories following Denis Davydov (2014) when he discusses debt financing, firm 
performance and banking in emerging markets.  
a. Fixed Ke theory  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Fixed Ke theory 
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Under the fixed Ke theory, or fixed required return for a firm s‟ shareholders, the average cost 
of capital of the firm at first decreases as increasing the level of debt in the capital structure to 
some point then it begins to go up. It is explained that the average cost of capital declines 
since under the assumption of favorable financial leverage, when the firm increases higher 
level of debt, on the average, K0 will drop. If the firm however keeps up higher level of debt, 
creditors shall perceive risk, which makes pressure on interest rates to increase. Until to some 
point, the incremental cost of debt, Ki will pass the initial required return for the firm K0, 
thereby leads to an increase in K0. This is illustrated in the Figure 2 above.  
From the figure 2, it is clear to see the impact of additional debt in the capital structure 
regarding the average costs of debt, equity, and capital. Return to the main point, the goal of 
the firm is to increase the common stock value so under the fixed Ke theory, CSmkt is 
expressed as ratio between earnings before taxes and Ke, or EBT/Ke, then to maximize the 
common stock value, the EBT should be maximized. This can reached when the firm 
increases its level of debt until the incremental debt Ki reaches the K0. The illustration of this 
point is given in the Figure 3 below.  
 
3.1.2.1 Fixed K0 theory 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The optimal point in capital structure under fixed Ke theory 
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Under the fixed K0 theory, the firm‟s average required return for shareholder first increases 
when additional level of debt then decreases when end of favorable financial leverage. If the 
firm continues to rise the level of debt, eventually Ki, Ke, and K0 will be equal. When Ke 
reaches its peak, shareholders will start to undertake the sale of their stock since financial 
leverage is unfavourable. The shareholders who determine to sell their stocks afterwards will 
experience a decrease in stock value and then a drop in Ke. Figure 4 will depict this theory. 
From the figure 4, it would seem that the optimal point in the capital structure is the point that 
maximizes Ke; that is where Ki is equal to K0. 
 
Percentage 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Increasing cost of equity capital under fixed Ke theory 
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Figure 5. Fixed K0 theory with no optimal capital structure 
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In fact, however, if the firm experiences a low level of debt, then Ke will not be high but if 
the firm has a higher level of debt, Ke increases to some point until investors perceive risk 
concerning in the capital structure, then this possibly lead to a decrease in common stock 
value. The fixed K0 theory thus gives no optimal point in capital structure provided that the 
target debt level is not exceeded. Under the target level, additional debt causes a higher Ke for 
shareholders, but over the target level, the advantages of favourable leverage are offset by the 
risk perceived by investors. The figure 5 shows the overall view of optimal capital structure 
under fixed K0 theory.  
 
3.1.2.2 Varying Ke theory  
Under varying Ke theory, the Ke increases when debt is added. The slope of the K0 curve is 
dependent on the slope of the Ke curve. If  Ke goes up dramatically with the additional level 
of debt then K0 will increase as a result, which causes an upward sloping K0but if Ke climbs 
more slowly, K0 will first fall then start to soar, which lead to a U-shape function. These two 
cases can be shown in figure 6.  
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Figure 6. Cost of capital under varying Ke theory 
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Under the varying Ke theory, there are two stages required to determine the optimal point in 
the capital structure. First, it is necessary to determine whether the firm can gain benefits of 
facvourable financial leverage. If the Ke escalate significantly as additional debt is issued, a 
decrease in stock price causing a rising Ke will offset the benefits of leverage. Under such a 
circumstance, the optimal capital structure should have no debt. 
In case of flat Ke function, the firm first obtains benefits of leverage then to some point, the 
additional debt leads to a rise in the Ke and the stock price starts to fall, which implies risk in 
the structure. The optimal point is where the firm gains maximum benefits of leverage. This 
can be illustrated in Figure 7.   
 
Euros 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Optimal Capital Structure under varying Ke theory 
In general, the conventional capital structure theorems provide three valuable conclusions. 
Firstly, under a perfect market context, firm would be indifferent to the source of capital. 
Secondly, when corporate taxes are included, the optimal capital structure is entirely debt 
finance due to tax shield so that firm can increase its value. In practice, however, 100% debt 
financing is to some extend difficult to achieve, unless it is impossible since a rise in interest 
payments due to higher level of debt to a certain point is likely to go beyond the advantages 
of tax shield according to the law of diminishing returns, which might result in higher cost of 
debt.  Finally, the personal taxes will weaken the theoretical tax advantage of firm debt. This 
implies that the optimal capital structure is heterogeneous to each firm and there is no global 
equilibrium existent. These traditional theorems though lay the foundation for studying the 
capital structure still fail to explain the practical combination of debt and equity. Other 
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modern capital structure theories therefore are developed to explain the practical composition 
of capital financing. Section 3.2 and 3.3 present these modern theories in corporate finance.  
 
3.2 The trade-off theory  
The trade-off theory is extended study based on Modigliani & Miller (1963) preposition, 
which takes financial distress into account. Financial distress occurs when debt to creditors is 
default. MM preposition suggests that „firms should be 100% debt financing‟ but in practice, 
it is impossible to achieve since creditors demand an offsetting cost of debt because higher 
level of debt might cause firms to fall into financial distress problem. To avoid default risk, 
creditors require compensation in advance in the form of higher interest rate for firm debt. 
This in turn leads to a decrease in stockholders‟ payoffs and also present value of their shares. 
The value of the firm thus can be defined as following Brealey et al. (2011):  
Value of firm (V) = Value if all equity financed + PV (tax shield) + PV (costs of financial 
distress)  
The trade-off theory therefore suggests the optimal capital structure as the trade-off between 
the tax advantages and the likelihood and costs of financial distress. If the level of debt is 
moderate, the probability of financial distress is low so the present value of financial distress 
is inconsiderable so the tax benefits dominate in such cases. However, when the level of debt 
is high, the probability of financial distress to a certain point will multiply with the increment 
of borrowings, which pushes up the cost of financial distress and in turn make it prevail over 
the tax shield. The theoretical equilibrium under this theory therefore is reached when the 
present value of tax shield is compensated by increases in the present value of costs of 
distress.  
A study investigating more specifically a factor contributing into financial distress is first 
proposed by Kraus and Litzenberger (1973), in which they present that the optimal leverage 
is decided by a trade-off between the tax advantages of debt and the deadweight costs of 
bankruptcy. Firm bankruptcies occur when stockholders exercise their “right to default” 
when a firm is in financial distress. According to this theory, the firm value is reinforced 
when the marginal tax advantages exceed the marginal bankruptcy costs and the optimum 
point is defined as equilibrium between two factors. Myers (1984) further examines this 
relationship and presents the static tradeoff hypothesis. Myers suggests that firms propose a 
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target debt-to-value ratio then gradually approaches towards the target. The target debt ratios 
are not homogeneous for all firms. Safe firms with many tangible assets and much should 
target higher ratios. Conversely, for firms with low level of profit or much intangible assets 
should count primarily on equity financing. He also states that hazardous firms should 
borrow less, ceteris paribus. When the variance of the market value of the firm is high, the 
likelihood of default on debts increases so safe firms should borrow more before the costs of 
financial distress exceed the tax benefits of debt financing. Two conclusions drawn from 
Myers model are that the choice of debt and equity is not only static process but also can be 
adjusted over periods. In practice, however, the empirical tests of this hypothesis provides 
mixed results and those results are trivial due to the absence of retained earnings in the 
assumptions, which is the key to make capital structure decision.  
 
Figure 8. Net benefits to leverage (Source: Korteweg, The Journal of Finance, 2010)  
Though the trade-off theory allows explaining variable capital structure equilibrium for many 
industries, it in fact has been revised and adjusted for over 40 years by accounting for some 
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other assumptions such as taxes, transaction costs or payout policy. It though still raises a 
concern about its reliability and practical use for modern corporate finance. In practice, Wald 
(1999) shows that the most profitable firms frequently borrow the least while the trade-off 
theory prognosticates exactly the reverse. According to the trade-off theory, profitable firms 
have more debt-servicing capacity, which implies stronger incentives to debt finance.  
Arthur Korteweg (2010) analyzes the net benefits to leverage and shows that firms with low 
market-to-book ratio, high tangible assets ratio, low depreciation, high profitability and low 
volatility of earnings have higher net benefits at all leverage ratios. The optimal debt-equity 
ratio however varies systematically with firm characteristics. He also notices that firms with 
high levels of debt have lower net benefit during recessions in comparison with expansions. 
The optimal leverage ratio can be illustrated below according to Korteweg.  
This above figure depicts the advantage of debt as a ratio of total firm value (B/V
L
 on the 
vertical axis) varies with the different levels of debt (L on the horizontal axis). According to 
Korteweg, this is estimated following the model of net benefits relative to firm value:  
Bi,t/Vi,t
L
 = X’0it0 + (X’1it . Lit)1 + (X’2it . Lit
2
)2 
The above quadratic specification captures the possibility of non-linear relationship between 
leverage and firm value as prognosticated by theory: the firm value may switch from positive 
to negative at higher levels of debt. The vector X0it, X1it, X2it contains firm characteristics, 
including profitability, the fraction of intangible assets, and market-to-book ratios. The above 
figure shows that the law of diminish exists as the level of debt increases, net benefits 
increase but the marginal benefits decrease when higher level of leverage. This also implies 
the existence of optimal point of capital structure. These graphs measure the different optimal 
leverage in three scenarios such as median firm (in an economic expansion), firm at either its 
10
th
 or 90
th
 percentile of the sample distribution. The optimal leverage ratio is marked with an 
“x” in the graphs. The figure shows that low market-to-book firms which have high 
profitability, low depreciation, low volatility of earnings, and high level of tangible assets 
attain higher net benefits at all level of leverage. The bottom-right graph illustrates the net 
benefits for a firm in recession compared to expansion.  
While an optimal capital structure consensus fails to be achieved, much study is still 
examined, and on-going theories continue to be evolved to explain the practical choice of 
debt and equity.  
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3.3 The pecking order theory  
An alternative model explaining the practical capital structure decision is the pecking order 
theory that takes asymmetric information into account. Asymmetric information is a term 
indicating that mangers know more about their firms‟ risk and values than outsiders do. 
Managers transfer information to investor through firm announcements of dividend policy. 
When managers expect their firms‟ stock prices to increase, announcements of higher 
dividend paid are made to signal investors as a good indication due to higher future earnings 
expectation. Asymmetric information exerts a significant impact on the choice of internal and 
external financing and of new issues of debt and equity securities. This results in a pecking 
order, a hierarchical allocation of capital sources, which is originally presented by Myers 
(1984). He suggests that firms commonly prefer internal finance rather than using external 
sources. It is argued that firms would rather choose internal financing than external financing 
to avoid issue costs such as administrative, underwriting costs or in some cases, costs 
occurred when the new securities are underpriced. Then debt financing dominates the equity 
financing if external sources are demanded.  Firms issue new equity as a last resort when they 
exhaust debt-servicing capacity or in other words, they fall into financial distress.  
An explanation for this choice is still due to higher costs of issuing new equity. Under the 
pecking order theory, there is non-existence of target debt-to-value ratio due to two kinds of 
equity, internal and external, one on the top of the hierarchical allocation and another at the 
bottom. The debt ratio varies from firms to firms, which reflects their cumulative 
requirements for external sources. The pecking order theory allows explaining why profitable 
firms commonly borrow the least, which is reverse true as the trade-off theory suggests. 
Higher profit implies higher retained earnings, which allows firms to generate the internal 
source to finance their operating and investing activities. Myers also notices that investors‟ 
reaction and managerial incentives create an impact on the choice between debt and equity. 
In the joint paper by him and Nicholas Majluf (1984), it is argued that due to symmetric 
information between internal users and outsiders, a firm can lure its attractiveness to 
investors by following the hierarchy order of capital sources. It is clear that if any project that 
generates positive present value, increases profitability and makes firms thrive then it would 
hardly be financed by issuing equity since the current shareholders would not rather slice up a 
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profitable “pie” to the new ones. Conversely, when the project may entail more risks and 
incur higher costs, then the current shareholders prefer reallocating this risk to the new ones.  
The following section presents the pecking order models based on adverse selection and 
agency costs.  
 
3.3.1 Adverse Selection  
The most popular reason for explaining the pecking order theory is adverse selection 
originated by Myers and Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). Before investigating  the study of 
Myers et al. , it is essential to mention to Akerlof‟s (1970) adverse selection argument of the 
reason behind the fact that prices of used cars are substantially  lower than new cars‟. The 
seller of a used car usually has advantage of information about the performance of the car to 
purchasers so buyers demand a discount to offset the lack of information resulting in the 
possibility that they may purchase an “Akerlof lemon”.  
According to Myers and Majluf, the inside mangers know more about the firm value than 
investors. If the mangers decide external financing by equity, investors would question the 
reason behind it. Due to asymmetric information, there is high possibility that the market 
misprices a firm‟s shares. The investors therefore require a higher level of return to offset the 
risk of “Akerlof lemon”, which means that if firms fail to persuade investors about its true 
performance then financing by equity has an “adverse selection premium”. Myers (2001) also 
suggests that “issuing overpriced shares would transfer value from new investors to existing 
shareholders”. This point results in a drop in share prices, which leads to higher possibility 
that potential profitable projects are compulsory to be rejected. This explains how 
asymmetric information makes rational investors require a „risk premium‟, which  causes 
financing by equity to become more expensive and less attractive  when a firm considers 
financing instruments.  
Cadsby et al. (1990) also points out, in the pooling equilibrium, the asymmetric information 
does not result in any lost in the project. However if the total assets of the firm are 
considerably greater than the net payoff of the project then the managers choose internal 
financing. Such kind of financing would avoid asymmetric information issue. However, 
adverse selection does not explain entirely the pecking order model. Regarding firm value, 
the pecking order model based on the adverse selection applies, firms prioritize debt 
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financing but when there is adverse selection about the risk, Halov and Heider (2004) argue 
that firms prefer equity financing rather than borrowing.  
 
3.3.2 Agency theory  
Regarding the agency theory, firstly it is essential to understand the agency problem where 
the interests of shareholders and managers are not ideally aligned. This idea was first 
developed by Jensen et al. (1976), who gave particular attention to the effect of agency cost 
resulted from conflict of shareholders and managers‟ interests, where managers tend to act in 
pursuit of maximizing their utilities. Elsas and Florysiak (2008) also agree that there is an 
incline that managers “hold cash excessively to avoid the supervisor of investors and this is a 
part of behavioral finance theory, in which agents behave irrationally”. Thus, to bring down 
costs relating agency, Grossman and Hart (1982) argue that shareholders attempt to restrict 
the managers‟ access to internal funds, instead that, they impulse managers to raise external 
finance. Moreover, both Grossman et al. (1982) and Jensen (1986) agree that more debt is an 
instrument to discipline managers and decrease agency costs since the liabilities of interests 
are “binding than a pledge to pay dividends”.  
 
 
Figure 9. Determination of the optimal scale of the firm. (Source: Jensen et al. 1976)  
 
The below figure presents the optimal scale of the firm when there is no monitoring. At point 
C, where investment is 100% internal funded by entrepreneur, the optimum investment is I* 
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and the perks benefit is F*. At point D, where external financing through equity is utilized, 
the optimum investment is I‟ and the perks benefits is F. The difference between internal and 
external financing is A measuring the gross agency costs. From this figure, Jensen et al. 
implies that preference to internal source of capital still prevails following the pecking order 
hierarchy.  
 
3.4 Emerging Markets Finance 
The majority of financial papers focus on studying and examining the empirical models in 
developed markets, predominantly in the U.S. market. Financially developed countries 
obviously are the most largest and efficient markets regarding information transmission, 
legislation system, and market liberalization. Researchers thus conduct the empirical tests of 
existing theoretical models employing data from developed markets. However, since the late 
1980s, along with the dissemination of information technologies, the globalization has 
created a significant impact on facilitating free flows of goods, services plus capital mobility 
from countries to countries. Due to penetration of international trade, domestic financial 
markets are open to foreign investors and financial institutions, which makes a significant 
contribution to structural change in the emerging economies. It therefore arouses much 
interest amongst economist to observe the fast substantial growth and expansion in those 
markets. Due to higher volatility and returns, lucrative investment opportunities, and 
interdependencies with developed markets, the emerging economies such as China, Russia, 
Brazil and India have drawn much attention in the academic study. This section briefly 
reviews a few noticeable differences between emerging market and developed market and 
sum up recent issues in emerging financial market.  
3.4.1 “BRICs” 
The International Monetary Fund categorizes about 25 countries into “emerging economies” 
but the majority of them are quite small and less developed regarding financial markets. 
Researchers therefore in fact mainly focus on several economies that are the largest and play 
a role as the driving force of the economic growth in emerging markets.  
In 2001, in “The World Needs Better Economic BRICs”, a paper from Goldman Sachs‟s 
“Global Economic Paper” series, Jim O‟Neil first coined the term “BRIC” implying four 
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most lucrative markets including Brazil, Russia, India, and China. 
 
3.4.2. Current Economy 
 
Table 1. Size of the world (Source: Goldman Sachs, Building Better Global Economic 
BRICs, Global Economics, paper no: 66) 
According to statistics from this paper, by the end of 2000, GDP in US dollar on a Purchasing 
Power Parity (PPP) basis, the aggregate size of “BRIC” share was about 23.3% of the world 
GDP, which was to some extend greater than both European Union and Japan. Amongst 
those emerging economies, China is even already larger than some individual G7 countries. 
At the same time, China contributes 3.6% of world GDP in US dollar, which is somewhat 
greater than Italy and Canada. Table 1 below shows the current GPD of 20 leading countries 
all over the world based on PPP and current prices basis by the end of 2000. As can be seen 
from the table, GDP of all four largest emerging economies exceeds GDP of Canada.  
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Table 2. GDP weight in BRIC (Source: Goldman Sachs, Building Better Global Economic 
BRICs, Global Economics, paper no: 66) 
Table 2 takes a closer look on GDP weight in four largest emerging markets on both PPP and 
current price basis. It was also estimated that the aggregate size of GDP in BRIC even 
exceeds the cumulative value of the G7 countries by 2035. However, the financial crisis in 
2008 has had a devastating impact on the leading countries in the world, which makes this 
prediction slightly optimistic. In fact, after financial crisis, the world has witnessed the 
recovery in BRIC countries, which somewhat is better than most of developed economies. 
This again reemphasizes the important role of those emerging economies. In another paper 
from Goldman Sachs, O‟Neil et al. (2009) even have a more optimistic look on the economic 
growth in BRIC, and predicted that Russian economy will grow dramatically and exceeds 
Japanese economy.  
Recently, according to statistics from World Bank, after financial crisis, the growth rates in 
BRIC economies have accelerated significantly and BRIC gradually become the driving force 
in the global economic recovery. Due to higher volatility and returns, lucrative investment 
opportunities, and interdependencies with developed markets, international investors move 
towards the emerging economies as a good source of diversification. Therefore, this thesis 
focuses on studying the emerging markets including Brazil, Russia, India and China.  
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IV- DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY 
The empirical analysis in this thesis employs data on large, publicly listed companies from 
the four largest emerging economies including Brazil, Russia, India and China to observe the 
effect of financial leverage on firm performance. The data are obtained in the period from 
2003 to 2013 from Bureau Van Dijk‟s ORBIS database, which creates a panel data. These 
firms will be catagorized into different sectors as capital structure of different industries 
varies and is subject to several specific regulations. Unleveraged firms and firms with 
insufficient financial information will be excluded from the sample.  
 
Regression model with firm performance measurement as dependent variables and financial 
leverage as independent variables is run to examine relationship between capital structure and 
firm performance.   
 
4.1. Measuring Firm Performance 
Firm performance is measured by return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA). The ROE 
is calculated as net profit extracted from income statement dividing by total equity from 
balance sheet for each company. The ROA is calculated as net profit dividing by total asset 
obtained from balance sheet also.  
4.2. Capital structure 
Capital structure is decided based on firms‟ financial leverage, which is scrutinized through 
several types of debt ratios such as short-term debt ratio, long-term debt ratio and debt-equity 
ratio. Short-term debt ratio (STD) is measured as the current liabilities over total assets; long-
term debt ratio (LTD) is measured as the non-current liabilities over total assets and total debt 
ratio (LEV) is calculated as the total liabilities over total assets.  
4.3. Control Variables 
According to Anderson and Reeb (2003), some control variables are included in the model to 
manage firm characteristics when measuring firm performance. They suggest that firm‟s size 
and its growth in total assets may affect to its performance. In other words, larger firms might 
be more beneficial. As a result, this study controls for the differences in firm‟s scale by 
including the size and growth variables into the model. The natural log of the book value of 
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total assets is used to measure firm size and changes in total assets are measured as firm 
growth.  
4.4. Models  
4.4.1. Firm performance and financial leverage 
To examine the impact of leverage on firm efficiency, the regression equations for firm 
performance are formulated as follows:  
ROE = 0 + 1LTDi,t+ 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t                      (1) 
ROA = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t                      (2) 
In which,  
LTDi,t : long-term debt ratio for firm i at time t 
STDi,t: short-term debt ratio for firm i at time t  
LEVi,t: total debt ratio for firm i at time t 
Sizei,t: size of firm i at time t 
Growthi,t: growth of firm i at time t  
i,t: the error term   
Another model is also estimated to examine the impact of leverage on performance when 
considering the influence of year since ROA and ROE have changed through years. The 
model is quite similar with the model used in Martikainen et al. (2007) as followed:  
ROE = 0 +  2012𝑦=2003 y𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑦
+ 1LTDi,t+ 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t 
ROA = 0 +  2012𝑦=2003 y𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑦
+ 1LTDi,t+ 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t 
where𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑦
 is a dummy variable indicating a fiscal year from 2003 to 2013.         
 
4.4.2. Firm performance and financial leverage during economic downturns 
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This paper also addressed the question of how financial leverage affects firm performance in 
industry downturns in different environments to see whether the costs of financial distress are 
greater than the potential benefits and this may vary across countries. Industries, which have 
been experienced downturn, are identified as “economically distress industries” if their 
median sales growth of the industries are negative.  
To examine how the firm performance response to leverage in economic downturn, a dummy 
variable is included, DID takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of the industry is 
negative and median stock return is below -30%, and 0 otherwise, using the Arello and Bond 
(1991). Thus, regression models are formulated as follows:  
ROE = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2STDi,t + 3LEVi,t + 4Sizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6DID + 7DID x LEV 
+ i,t                      (1) 
ROA = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2STDi,t + 3LEVi,t + 4Sizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6DID + 7DID x LEV 
+ i,t                      (2) 
 
4.4.3. Financially distressed and non-distressed firms  
The analysis so far focuses on the relationship between financial leverage and firm 
performance in two different types of firms, including financially distressed firms with high 
level of financial constraints and non-distressed firms based on the Altman‟s (1968) Z-
score*. This final stage of the analysis deals with the issue of whether different extents of 
financial distress affect the association of financial leverage and firm performance.  Financial 
distressed firms are identified with the Altman‟s Z-score when they are in the bottom third of 
the sample's Z-score distribution, whose Z-cores are lower than 1.42. That indicates there 
arehighly likely these firms go bankruptcy. Financially non-distressed firms are at the top 
third of the distribution, whose Z-score are higher than 2.46. 
Z-score is Altman‟s (1968) Z-score and calculated as (1.2 x working capital + 1.4 x retained 
earnings + 3.3 x earnings before interest and taxes + 0.999 x sales) / total assets + 0.6 x 
(market value of equity/book value of debt).  
 
V- EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1.Descriptive Statistics  
Table 3.Descriptive Statistics– China 
The table provides descriptive statistics of the main variables.  Firm performance is measured by return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and Tobin‟s Q. The ROE is 
calculated as net profit extracted from income statement dividing by total equity from balance sheet for each company. The ROA is calculated as net profit dividing by total 
asset obtained from balance sheet also. Short-term debt ratio (STD) is measured as the current liabilities over total assets, long-term debt ratio (LTD) is measured as the non-
current liabilities over total assets and total debt ratio, leverage (LEV) is calculated as the total liabilities over total assets. The natural log of the book value of total assets is 
used to measure firm size and changes in total assets are measured as firm growth. 
  Firm Growth Leverage  Firm Size Long-term debt ratio Short-term debt ratio ROE ROA 
 Mean 0.377 0.346 15.526 0.129 0.218 6.337 4.848 
 Median 0.178 0.347 15.313 0.089 0.201 7.950 4.350 
 Maximum 321.099 0.884 21.570 0.829 0.826 187.120 49.500 
 Minimum -0.986 0.000 11.781 0.000 0.000 -6968.220 -46.770 
 Std. Dev. 4.736 0.163 1.387 0.129 0.135 104.027 5.158 
 Skewness 65.972 0.098 0.896 1.365 0.540 -64.091 -0.415 
 Kurtosis 4465.156 2.580 4.109 4.771 2.801 4289.779 15.706 
Jarque-Bera 3910000000.00 42.11 872.40 2079.43 237.12 3610000000.00 31840.64 
 Probability 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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 Sum 1778.669 1632.931 73175.300 605.930 1027.001 29867.900 22847.900 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 105680.300 125.130 9070.327 78.117 85.747 50991836.000 125372.600 
 Observations 4713.000 4713.000 4713.000 4713.000 4713.000 4713.000 4713.000 
 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix - China 
  Firm Growth  Firm Size Leverage 
Short-term debt 
ratio 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
Firm Growth 
1.00 
    
Firm Size 
-0.01 1.00 
   
Leverage 
-0.01 0.10 1.00 
  
Short-term debt ratio 
0.00 -0.18 0.64 1.00 
 
Long-term debt ratio 
-0.01 0.31 0.59 -0.24 1.00 
 
Table 5. Descriptive Statistics – India 
  
Firm Growth Firm Size Leverage Long-term debt ratio ROA ROE Short-term debt ratio 
  Firm Growth Firm Size Leverage Long-term debt ratio Short-term debt ratio ROA ROE 
 Mean 
0.298 16.533 0.321 0.195 0.126 8.835 15.490 
 Median 
0.187 16.463 0.325 0.168 0.105 7.760 15.370 
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 Maximum 
65.706 22.011 0.900 0.892 0.740 118.740 346.350 
 Minimum 
-1.000 10.818 0.000 0.000 0.000 -23.870 -914.260 
 Std. Dev. 
1.261 1.746 0.180 0.156 0.110 7.289 33.202 
 Skewness 
41.905 0.147 0.073 0.752 1.299 2.254 -10.685 
 Kurtosis 
2098.130 3.269 2.455 3.044 5.358 25.878 265.820 
Jarque-Bera 
643000000.000 23.289 46.589 331.029 1801.394 79540.810 10171837.000 
 Probability 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Sum 
1045.264 58047.350 1125.446 684.683 440.763 31019.390 54384.320 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
5580.545 10694.920 114.141 84.903 42.105 186506.200 3869226.000 
 Observations 
3511.000 3511.000 3511.000 3511.000 3511.000 3511.000 3511.000 
 
Table 6. Correlation Matrix – India 
 
Firm Growth  Firm Size Leverage Short-term debt ratio Long-term debt ratio 
Firm Growth 
1.00 
    
Firm Size 
0.00 1.00 
   
Leverage 
0.01 0.04 1.00 
  
Long-term ratio 
0.04 0.19 0.79 1.00 
 
Short-term ratio 
-0.04 -0.20 0.52 -0.11 1.00 
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Table 7. Descriptive Statistics – Russia 
  Firm Size Firm Growth Leverage Long-term debt ratio Short-term debt ratio ROE ROA 
 Mean 
17.716 0.258 0.300 0.172 0.128 10.231 7.539 
 Median 
17.743 0.172 0.284 0.141 0.091 10.370 6.360 
 Maximum 
23.214 19.717 1.020 0.879 0.679 133.820 51.420 
 Minimum 13.094 -0.961 0.000 0.000 0.000 -324.580 -26.400 
 Std. Dev. 
2.047 0.858 0.185 0.151 0.122 31.974 8.479 
 Skewness 0.125 16.114 0.489 1.214 1.524 -3.992 0.640 
 Kurtosis 
2.543 349.136 2.837 4.579 5.570 36.732 6.029 
Jarque-Bera 
8.735 3892340.000 31.623 270.327 511.976 38702.420 348.301 
 Probability 
0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Sum 
13694.720 199.193 232.262 132.941 99.322 7908.780 5827.470 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
3234.024 568.132 26.326 17.625 11.517 789257.000 55499.340 
 Observations 
773.000 773.000 773.000 773.000 773.000 773.000 773.000 
 
Table 8. Correlation Matrix – Russia 
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Firm Growth  Firm Size Leverage Short-term debt ratio Long-term debt ratio 
Firm Growth 
1.00 
    
Firm Size 
0.03 1.00 
   
Leverage 
0.04 -0.36 1.00 
  
Short-term debt ratio 
0.11 -0.39 0.56 1.00 
 
Long-term debt ratio 
-0.04 -0.13 0.77 -0.11 1.00 
 
Table 9. Descriptive Statistics – Brazil 
  Firm Growth Firm Size Leverage Long-term debt ratio ROA ROE Short-term debt ratio 
 Mean 
0.274 14.621 0.283 0.172 8.151 8.662 0.110 
 Median 
0.130 14.633 0.276 0.151 7.600 11.915 0.080 
 Maximum 
35.937 20.989 1.081 0.682 67.510 663.460 1.081 
 Minimum -11.103 7.746 0.000 0.000 -45.820 -1794.710 0.000 
 Std. Dev. 
1.314 1.971 0.166 0.140 8.075 78.317 0.100 
 Skewness 19.021 0.279 0.387 0.752 -0.035 -14.321 1.874 
 Kurtosis 
478.724 3.413 2.889 3.037 9.255 299.659 9.610 
Jarque-Bera 
20934943.000 44.242 56.228 207.955 3596.908 8164676.000 5307.073 
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 Probability 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Sum 
604.929 32253.670 623.239 379.862 17981.890 19108.860 243.376 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 
3805.177 8567.674 60.527 43.311 143791.000 13524525.000 22.053 
 Observations 
2206.000 2206.000 2206.000 2206.000 2206.000 2206.000 2206.000 
 
Table 10. Correlation Matrix – Brazil 
 Leverage Firm Size Firm Growth Long-term debt ratio Short-term debt ratio 
Leverage 
1.000         
Firm Size 
0.055 1.000 
   
Firm Growth 
-0.018 -0.009 1.000 
  
Long-term debt ratio 
0.836 0.140 -0.027 1.000 
 
Short-term debt ratio 
0.516 -0.118 0.010 -0.039 1.000 
All the tables above provide descriptive statistics and correlation matrix of the main variables 
used in this thesis. As can be seen from those tables, the mean (median) of the variables 
“leverage” in all four countries are quite the same then the data in the samples is evenly 
divided around the mean. Additionally, the level of leverage is quite the same in Brazil, 
Russia and India, the median (mean) of leverage in these countries is around 0.28; except for 
China, the level of leverage is highest amongst them with median (mean) is approximately 
0.35. The skewness of the variables “leverage” is quite small and the kurtosis of this variable 
is roughly 3 in all four countries so the distribution of data is symmetric (normal) around the 
mean. The same scenario can be found in the independent variable “long-term debt ratio” 
(low skewness, mean and median are quite the same, and kurtosis is about 3) so the data has 
normal distribution. In terms of control variables, the variable “firm size” in the selected 
countries has also quite the same mean and median, low skewness (less than 1) and kurtosis 
is slightly above 3 then the data can be regarded as normally distributed.  The number of 
observations in China is 4713, while in India, Russia and Brazil, the sample has 3511, 733 
and 2206 observations respectively. Regarding the correlation matrix, in all four countries, 
the correlation between firm size, firm growth and leverage is small. The correlation however 
between leverage and long-term debt as well as short-term debt is moderate. This is 
explainable since leverage includes long-term debt in it. In the next part, the multicollinearity 
test is run to check whether the correlation between leverage and long-term debt seriously 
affects the results.  
Table 11. Multicollinearity test using variance inflation factor (VIF) 
  ROA ROE 
 
Variable 
Centered 
VIF 
Variable 
Centered 
VIF 
Brazil C 
NA C NA 
 
LEV 
1.006 LEV 1.052 
 
LTD 
1.316 LTD 1.338 
 
Firm growth 
1.000 Firm growth 1.000 
 
Firm size 
1.313 Firm size 1.389 
China C 
NA C NA 
 
LEV 
1.562 LEV 1.565 
 
LTD 
1.716 LTD 1.719 
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Firm growth 
1.000 Firm growth 1.000 
 
Firm size 
1.124 Firm size 1.124 
India C 
NA C NA 
 
LEV 
2.787 LEV 2.836 
 
LTD 
2.873 LTD 2.930 
 
Firm growth 
1.003 Firm growth 1.003 
 
Firm size 
1.061 Firm size 1.065 
Russia C 
NA C NA 
 
LEV 
2.928 LEV 2.804 
 
LTD 
2.583 LTD 2.476 
 
Firm growth 
1.019 Firm growth 1.020 
  Firm size 
1.228 Firm size 1.224 
 
Table 11 shows the Variance inflation factor to quantify the intensity of multicollinearity in 
an ordinary least squares regression analysis. It produces an indicator to measure how much 
the variance of an estimated regression coefficient is inflated due to collinearity. As can be 
seen in this table, the test is run based on two models with ROA and ROE as the dependent 
variables. The VIFs for firm growth and firm size variables are quite small, just over 1 in all 
countries indicating that there is almost no correlation among those independent variables. 
With regard to leverage and long-term debt, VIFs are slightly higher. In China and Brazil, the 
figures are over 1 and in India and Russia, the figures are less than 3 implying there is a slight 
correlation between these variables but this level is still acceptable and does little affect the 
models examined.  
5.2.Firm performance and Financial Leverage 
Table 12. Firm performance and Leverage 
Regressions are estimated using the model ROE = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t and 
ROA = 0 + 1LTDi,t  + 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t. The dependent variable firm performance is 
measured by return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA). The ROE is calculated as net profit extracted from 
income statement dividing by total equity from balance sheet for each company. The ROA is calculated as net 
profit dividing by total asset obtained from balance sheet also. The independent variables are short-term debt 
ratio (STD) is measured as the current liabilities over total assets, long-term debt ratio (LTD) is measured as the 
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non-current liabilities over total assets and total debt ratio, leverage (LEV) is calculated as the total liabilities 
over total assets. The control variables are firm size, which is measured by the natural log of the book value of 
total assets and firm growth estimated by changes in total assets are measured as firm growth. Panel A describes 
the relationship between leverage and firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA). Panel B presents 
the link between leverage and firm performance measured by return on equity (ROE). *,**, &*** denote 
significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Panel A: ROA 
China C 4.370 0.675 6.472 0.0000 
 Long-term debt 6.516 0.632 10.315 0.0000 
 Leverage -10.499*** 0.467 -22.466 0.0000 
 Firm size 0.200 0.043 4.675 0.0000 
 Firm growth 0.047 0.014 3.266 0.0011 
India C 14.032 1.117 12.563 0.0000 
 Long-term debt 6.508 1.211 5.373 0.0000 
 Leverage -21.788*** 1.030 -21.143 0.0000 
 Firm size 0.029 0.066 0.437 0.6621 
 Firm growth 0.207 0.090 2.291 0.0220 
Russia C 12.819 2.316 5.536 0.0000 
 Long-term debt 6.760 2.466 2.741 0.0062 
 Leverage -18.379*** 2.168 -8.477 0.0000 
 Firm Growth 0.863 0.151 5.708 0.0000 
 Firm Size -0.083 0.122 -0.680 0.4963 
Brazil C 4.536 1.755 2.584 0.0098 
 Long-term debt 17.916 2.308 7.763 0.0000 
 Leverage -15.907*** 1.981 -8.029 0.0000 
 Firm Size 0.295 0.118 2.494 0.0127 
 Firm Growth 0.155 0.068 2.301 0.0215 
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Panel B: ROE 
China C -12.972 12.095 -1.073 0.28350 
 Long-term debt 45.265 11.379 3.978 0.00010 
 Leverage -57.058*** 8.427 -6.771 0.00000 
 Firm size 2.168 0.766 2.831 0.00470 
 Firm growth 0.219 0.258 0.848 0.39640 
India C 26.188 5.376 4.871 0.00000 
 Long-term debt 27.492 5.891 4.667 0.00000 
 Leverage -67.787*** 5.032 -13.472 0.00000 
 Firm size 0.332 0.319 1.041 0.29790 
 Firm growth 0.793 0.432 1.835 0.06660 
Russia C 15.058 11.642 1.293 0.19610 
 Long-term debt 39.107 12.532 3.120 0.00180 
 Leverage -54.396*** 10.946 -4.969 0.00000 
 Firm Growth 2.352 0.757 3.108 0.00190 
 Firm Size 0.182 0.610 0.298 0.76600 
Brazil C -39.499 12.255 -3.223 0.00130 
 Long-term debt 84.725 18.664 4.540 0.00000 
 Leverage -98.874*** 15.076 -6.558 0.00000 
 Firm Size 4.213 0.850 4.957 0.00000 
 Firm Growth 0.335 0.437 0.767 0.44320 
 
Panel A presents the relationship between corporate performance and its leverage using 
return on asset (ROA) as the measurement of performance. The results show that the leverage 
has a negative effect on the firm performance. The negative coefficient in the variable 
“leverage” implicates that firms with higher level of leverage experience a loss in operating 
performance in comparison with more conservatively financed firms. The t-statistic of the 
variable “leverage” is very high in all four countries so this impact is considerably 
significant. Among four examined countries, the leverage in India is found to have the most 
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negative impact on its firm performance with the coefficient is up to approx. -21.8 and this 
impact is very significant. However, interestingly, the results reveal that long-term debt has a 
positive influence on firm performance in all four countries. This can be explained that higher 
level of long-term debt forces managers to maximize the firm value and thereby reduces 
manager discretions. Nevertheless, these effects are diminishing when firms are escalating 
the level of debt. It is probably reason why leverage has a negative impact on firm 
performance while long-term debt positively affects the firm value. It asserts the existence of 
optimal capital structure. Regarding control variables, table 11 shows that firm growth has 
slight positive impact on the firm performance in all four countries but firm size is found to 
affect ROA in only China and Brazil.  
Consistently, Panel B also shows that the relationship between leverage and firm 
performance measured by return on equity (ROE) is negative. The coefficients are even 
higher when firm performance is measure by ROE. This effect is indicated as very significant 
since t-statistics is extremely high in all four countries. The same vein is found in panel B 
when long-term debt positively affects the firm performance but again it cannot be offset the 
negative effect caused by leverage. This again affirms the diminishing rule of level of debt 
financed by firms. In regards of the control variables, firm size has insignificant effect on the 
firm performance in India and Russia whereas it positively affects the corporate performance 
in China and Brazil. Russia is only the country that firm growth has a significant positive 
influence on ROE while in the other countries; there is no evidence of relationship between 
firm growth and ROE.  
To investigate whether the multicollinearity is problematic in the model since leverage and 
long-term debt could probably be correlated, the long-term debt variable is omitted from the 
model. Table 13 shows that the relationship between level of debt and firm performance 
without observing the long-term debt in the data. The table has presented a consistent result 
with the above outcome. It reveals that leverage has a significant negative effect on the firm 
performance measured by ROA and ROE in both panels. More specifically, in Panel A, the 
influence of leverage still persists regardless of omitted “long-term debt” variable. In China, 
the level of debt significantly affects ROA with the coefficient of -9.3 in comparison of 
approx. -10.5 in the above table. In the same vein, in India and Russia, leverage detrimentally 
affects ROA with the coefficient of -17.36 and -8.64 respectively compared to approx. -21.8 
and -18.4 respectively when long-term debt variable is included. Noticeably, in Brazil, there 
is a significant change when excluding long-term debt variable out of the model although it 
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still suggests there is an adverse effect on firm performance when increasing the level of 
leverage. The coefficient the new model shows a more moderate influence of debt on ROA 
with -2.43 in comparison with -15.9 in the previous model. The control variables, however, 
show a weaker link with the firm performance in comparison with the model with long-term 
debt included though these still significantly affect the firm performance at 1% level in all 
four countries except for firm size variable in India with coefficient of 1. 
Table 13. Firm leverage and Firm Performance omitting long-term debt variable 
Regressions are estimated using the model ROE = 0  + 1LEVi,t + 2Sizei,t + 3Growthi,t + i,t and ROA = 0 + 
1LEVi,t + 2Sizei,t + 3Growthi,t + i,t. The dependent variable firm performance is measured by return on equity 
(ROE), return on assets (ROA). The ROE is calculated as net profit extracted from income statement dividing 
by total equity from balance sheet for each company. The ROA is calculated as net profit dividing by total asset 
obtained from balance sheet also. The independent variables are leverage (LEV) is calculated as the total 
liabilities over total assets. The control variables are firm size, which is measured by the natural log of the book 
value of total assets and firm growth estimated by changes in total assets are measured as firm growth. Panel A 
describes the relationship between leverage and firm performance measured by return on assets (ROA). Panel B 
presents the link between leverage and firm performance measured by return on equity (ROE). *,**, &*** 
denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
  Panel A: ROA  Panel B: ROE 
China 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
       C -0.463 -0.573 0.5663 -35.244 -2.068 0.0387 
LEVERAGE 9.307*** -21.109 0 44.973*** -4.827 0 
FIRM_GROWTH 0.035 2.323 0.0202 0.163 0.510 0.6104 
FIRM_SIZE 0.549 10.585 0 3.678 3.360 0.0008 
India 
C 12.499 11.535 0 19.552 3.760 0.0002 
LEVERAGE 17.360*** -28.007 0 
-
48.901*** -16.303 0 
FIRM_GROWTH 0.234 2.580 0.0099 0.905 2.091 0.0366 
FIRM_SIZE 0.113 1.747 0.0807 0.693 2.235 0.0255 
Russia 
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C -1.943 -0.666 0.5057 -10.739 -0.949 0.3429 
LEVERAGE 8.642*** -5.235 0 23.523*** -3.603 0.0003 
FIRM_GROWTH 0.720 2.117 0.0345 2.946 2.238 0.0255 
FIRM_SIZE 0.672 4.422 0 1.547 2.627 0.0088 
Brazil 
C 2.644 1.553 0.1206 -53.303 -4.357 0 
LEVERAGE 2.431*** -2.209 0.0272 49.811*** -4.999 0 
FIRM_GROWTH 0.665 3.631 0.0003 0.632 0.507 0.6123 
FIRM_SIZE 0.366 3.163 0.0016 5.192 6.110 0 
 
Panel B shows the link between leverage and firm performance measured by ROE in when 
the long-term debt variable is left out. The coefficients still remain higher than compared to 
panel A. This is consistent to the results suggested in the previous model where the leverage 
also has an extreme adverse influence on firm performance in all four countries.  
Table 14. Firm performance and financial leverage using dummies  
Firm performance and financial leverage through years. Regressions are estimated using the model ROE = 0 + 
 2012𝑦=2003 y𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑦
+ 1LTDi,t+ 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t and ROA = 0 +  2012𝑦=2003 y𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖
𝑦
+ 
1LTDi,t+ 2LEVi,t + 3Sizei,t + 4Growthi,t + i,t. DUMMY 1 to DUMMY 10 presents the period from 2003 to 
2012. *,**, &*** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
BRAZIL 
Dependent Variable ROA ROE 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   Coefficient t-Statistic Prob.   
C 
3.142 1.841 0.0658 -44.753 -3.563 0.0004 
LEVERAGE -22.784*** -8.188 0.0000 
-
128.874*** -5.923 0.0000 
LONG_TERM_RATIO 
16.145 6.987 0.0000 91.024 4.688 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_1 
11.347 3.781 0.0002 -49.044 -2.066 0.0389 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_2 
14.691 4.907 0.0000 64.874 2.699 0.0070 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_3 
15.760 5.149 0.0000 71.767 3.074 0.0021 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_4 
9.262 3.125 0.0018 47.091 2.035 0.0420 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_5 
6.016 1.934 0.0532 7.355 0.310 0.7565 
55 
 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_6 
3.741 1.345 0.1787 27.327 1.256 0.2093 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_7 
24.807 8.666 0.0000 48.208 2.163 0.0307 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_8 
6.789 2.421 0.0156 41.256 1.877 0.0607 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_9 
0.868 0.299 0.7652 3.741 0.176 0.8605 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_10 
0.256 0.087 0.9306 9.249 0.430 0.6671 
FIRM_GROWTH 
0.685 3.843 0.0001 1.631 1.310 0.1905 
FIRM_SIZE 
0.381 3.308 0.0010 4.568 5.262 0.0000 
       CHINA 
C 
0.2844 0.3207 0.7485 -22.868 -1.205 0.2282 
LEVERAGE 
-14.679*** -18.9182 0 -82.133*** -4.931 0 
LONG_TERM_RATIO 
6.0956 8.4730 0 52.500 3.409 0.0007 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_1 
3.8971 4.2270 0 28.304 1.433 0.1519 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_2 
4.5976 5.2129 0 33.023 1.747 0.0806 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_3 
2.8990 3.3584 0.0008 21.047 1.138 0.2553 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_4 
3.8828 4.4971 0 27.373 1.477 0.1398 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_5 
6.6535 7.6533 0.000 -34.126 -1.832 0.067 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_6 
1.9877 2.3762 0.0175 16.166 0.901 0.3676 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_7 
1.4078 1.6753 0.0939 15.705 0.872 0.3831 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_8 
3.4462 4.0693 0.000 24.345 1.342 0.1797 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_9 
2.6030 3.1211 0.0018 15.592 0.873 0.383 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_10 
0.7604 0.9172 0.3591 5.885 0.331 0.7404 
FIRM_GROWTH 
0.0313 2.1011 0.0357 0.138 0.433 0.6651 
FIRM_SIZE 
0.5059 8.9612 0 2.968 2.457 0.0141 
       INDIA 
C 
9.812 8.423 0.0000 4.693 0.848 0.3967 
LEVERAGE 
-25.249*** -20.466 0.0000 -97.913*** -16.258 0.0000 
LONG_TERM_RATIO 
2.958 2.389 0.0170 7.940 1.339 0.1808 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_1 
5.461 3.602 0.0003 18.525 2.541 0.0111 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_2 
8.995 6.162 0.0000 56.819 8.085 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_3 
11.040 7.982 0.0000 73.305 10.990 0.0000 
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LEVERAGE*DUMMY_4 
10.082 7.362 0.0000 72.401 11.037 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_5 
12.144 8.965 0.0000 74.415 11.488 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_6 
9.282 6.851 0.0000 55.496 8.568 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_7 
3.565 2.694 0.0071 40.776 6.430 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_8 
4.616 3.459 0.0005 47.046 7.354 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_9 
3.734 2.774 0.0056 39.758 6.177 0.0000 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY_10 
1.659 1.276 0.2019 24.248 3.875 0.0001 
FIRM_GROWTH 
0.174 1.947 0.0516 0.794 1.879 0.0603 
FIRM_SIZE 
0.272 3.939 0.0001 1.557 4.752 0.0000 
       RUSSIA 
C 
-2.170 -0.715 0.4747 -13.371 -1.148 0.2514 
LEVERAGE 
-14.538*** -4.064 0.0001 -28.607*** -2.056 0.0402 
LONG_TERM_RATIO 
6.681 2.233 0.0258 18.712 1.583 0.1137 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY1 
6.693 0.581 0.5612 61.566 1.393 0.164 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY2 
3.675 0.397 0.6915 8.349 0.235 0.8143 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY3 
13.997 2.677 0.0076 35.316 1.755 0.0796 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY4 
10.246 2.428 0.0154 38.549 2.369 0.0181 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY5 
6.678 1.905 0.0572 15.725 1.162 0.2455 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY6 
3.627 1.111 0.2668 -12.263 -0.970 0.3323 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY7 
0.714 0.223 0.824 0.920 0.073 0.9422 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY8 
-0.771 -0.243 0.8083 -29.320 -2.339 0.0196 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY9 
2.658 0.798 0.4249 6.113 0.476 0.6344 
LEVERAGE*DUMMY10 
-0.542 -0.167 0.867 -19.530 -1.562 0.1188 
FIRM_GROWTH 
0.682 1.947 0.0519 2.279 1.692 0.0911 
FIRM_SIZE 
0.673 4.282 0 1.623 2.689 0.0073 
 
Table 14 examines the impact of leverage on firm performance during years from 2003 to 
2013 using year dummies in emerging markets due to the fact that firm performance can vary 
from year to year. First, in panel A, Brazil is examined in the model and reveals that from 
2003 to 2005, the coefficients are highly positive due to economic growth in Brazil in this 
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period. Noticeably, in 2009, the coefficient is very high, making the relationship between 
leverage and firm performance positive probably due to the global financial crisis beginning 
from 2008. The same picture is found in panel B except for the fact that in 2003, the 
coefficient is negative, making the association even more negative. China and India witness 
trivial changes throughout years in both Panel A and B.  In Russia, the influence of variation 
in ROA and ROE through years is insignificant.    
5.3.Firm performance and financial leverage during economic downturns  
Table 15. Firm performance and financial leverage during economic downturns 
Firm performance and financial leverage during economic downturns. Regressions are estimated using the 
model ROE = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2STDi,t + 3LEVi,t + 4Sizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6DID + 7DID x LEV + i,t and 
ROA = 0 + 1LTDi,t + 2STDi,t + 3LEVi,t + 4Sizei,t + 5Growthi,t + 6DID + 7DID x LEV + i,t. The 
dependent variable firm performance is measured by return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA). The ROE 
is calculated as net profit extracted from income statement dividing by total equity from balance sheet for each 
company. The ROA is calculated as net profit dividing by total asset obtained from balance sheet also. The 
independent variables are short-term debt ratio (STD) is measured as the current liabilities over total assets, 
long-term debt ratio (LTD) is measured as the non-current liabilities over total assets and total debt ratio, 
leverage (LEV) is calculated as the total liabilities over total assets. The control variables are firm size, which is 
measured by the natural log of the book value of total assets and firm growth estimated by changes in total 
assets are measured as firm growth. Panel A describes the relationship between leverage and firm performance 
measured by return on assets (ROA). Panel B presents the link between leverage and firm performance 
measured by return on equity (ROE). A dummy variable, DID takes the value of 1 if the median sales growth of 
the industry is negative and median stock return is below -30%, and 0 otherwise, using the Arello and Bond 
(1991). *,**, &*** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%. 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
Panel A: ROA 
    China C 3.212 0.698 4.602 0.0000 
 
Short-term debt ratio -6.784 0.631 -10.746 0.0000 
 
Leverage -2.767*** 0.552 -5.015 0.0000 
 
Leverage*Dummy -2.093 0.336 -6.222 0.0000 
 
Firm Growth 0.045 0.014 3.165 0.0016 
 
Firm Size 0.273 0.044 6.184 0.0000 
India C 21.445 1.093 19.629 0.0000 
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Short-term debt ratio -8.970 1.280 -7.008 0.0000 
 
Leverage -8.055*** 0.721 -11.165 0.0000 
 
Leverage*Dummy -3.086 1.044 -2.955 0.0031 
 
Firm Size -0.562 0.063 -8.988 0.0000 
 
Firm Growth 0.300 0.104 2.879 0.0040 
Russia C 12.694 2.323 5.464 0.0000 
 
Short-term debt ratio -6.591 2.484 -2.653 0.0081 
 
Leverage -11.525*** 1.561 -7.382 0.0000 
 
Leverage*Dummy -0.807 2.006 -0.402 0.6874 
 
Firm Growth 0.861 0.151 5.692 0.0000 
 
Firm Size -0.077 0.122 -0.631 0.5284 
Brazil  C 5.495 1.708 3.218 0.0013 
 
Short-term debt ratio -17.401 2.326 -7.480 0.0000 
 
Leverage 0.546 1.280 0.427 0.6696 
 
Leverage*Dummy 18.236 2.110 8.644 0.0000 
 
Firm Growth 0.728 0.179 4.071 0.0000 
 
Firm Size 0.214 0.115 1.861 0.0629 
Panel B: ROE 
 
      
China C -15.039 12.538 -1.200 0.2304 
 
Short-term debt ratio -45.736 11.409 -4.009 0.0001 
 
Leverage -9.662 9.962 -0.970 0.3322 
 
Leverage*Dummy -3.707 6.079 -0.610 0.5421 
 
Firm Growth 0.216 0.258 0.837 0.4027 
 
Firm Size 2.299 0.793 2.899 0.0038 
India C 30.502 4.571 6.673 0.0000 
 
Short-term debt ratio -33.159 5.428 -6.109 0.0000 
 
Leverage -25.064*** 3.024 -8.289 0.0000 
 
Leverage*Dummy -7.500 4.372 -1.716 0.0863 
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Firm Size -0.180 0.261 -0.690 0.4905 
 
Firm Growth 0.933 0.434 2.147 0.0318 
Russia C 14.569 11.681 1.247 0.2125 
 
Short-term debt ratio -39.047 12.636 -3.090 0.0020 
 
Leverage -15.808* 8.342 -1.895 0.0583 
 
Leverage*Dummy 4.439 10.305 0.431 0.6667 
 
Firm Growth 2.366 0.758 3.122 0.0018 
 
Firm Size 0.206 0.612 0.336 0.7369 
Brazil C -39.616 12.530 -3.162 0.0016 
 
Short-term debt ratio -95.895 19.462 -4.927 0.0000 
 
Leverage -18.044 12.284 -1.469 0.1420 
 
Leverage*Dummy 26.615 17.116 1.555 0.1201 
 
Firm Growth 0.880 1.244 0.708 0.4792 
 
Firm Size 4.320 0.867 4.981 0.0000 
 
Table 15 reveals the interdependence between level of debt and firm performance associated 
with economic downturns measured by median sales growth of industry and median stock 
returns. Panel A illustrating model measured by ROA provides mixed results. China and 
India show a negative relationship between leverage and firm performance, and this link is 
even more adverse during economic downturns. This identifies that companies financed by 
more debt other than equity obtain poorer performance during economic decline. In the same 
vein, Russia shows similar picture but the link is insignificant.  In contrast, Brazil witnesses a 
significant positive link between leverage and firm performance during economic deteriorate 
periods. This suggests, in Brazil, during downtrends in economy, higher level of debt 
facilitates better for companies. Panel B observes inconsistent empirical results with Panel A. 
China and India still persist to show devastating relationship between leverage and firm 
performance during recession, it however is not significant. Russia and Brazil suggest a 
contradiction in trend when higher level of debt assists firms to achieve better performance 
but this independency is also trivial with low t-statistics.  
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5.4.Financially distressed and non-distressed firms  
Table 16. Financially distressed firms and non-financially distressed firms 
The table presents the estimates of Equation (1) and (2) for sub-samples of financially distressed and non-
distressed firms based on Altman (1968) Z-score. The dependent variable firm performance is measured by 
return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA). The ROE is calculated as net profit extracted from income 
statement dividing by total equity from balance sheet for each company. The ROA is calculated as net profit 
dividing by total asset obtained from balance sheet also. The independent variables are short-term debt ratio 
(STD) is measured as the current liabilities over total assets, long-term debt ratio (LTD) is measured as the non-
current liabilities over total assets and total debt ratio, leverage (LEV) is calculated as the total liabilities over 
total assets. The control variables are firm size, which is measured by the natural log of the book value of total 
assets and firm growth estimated by changes in total assets are measured as firm growth. Panel A represents the 
relationship between leverage and firm performance measured by ROA. Panel B shows the link between 
leverage and firm performance measured by ROE. *, **, &*** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%.  
Panel A: ROA 
    Z-score<1.42 Z-score>2.46 
 
Variable Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic 
China 
     
 
C 
0.663 0.660 -0.139 -0.027 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
5.610 6.684 5.266 1.708 
 
Leverage 
-11.839*** -18.694 -13.971*** -5.386 
 
Firm growth 
0.880 8.876 1.063 1.595 
 
Firm size 
0.464 7.208 0.583 1.745 
India 
     
 
C 
7.254 2.431 1.170 0.112 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
-2.039 -0.594 -14.951 -1.707 
 
Leverage 
-5.928* -1.960 -5.263 -0.581 
 
Firm growth 
1.849 3.055 2.318 1.225 
 
Firm size 
0.168 0.926 0.729 1.175 
Russia 
     
 
C 
12.833 2.096 -9.731 -1.386 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
7.082 1.296 7.554 1.005 
 
Leverage 
-18.473*** -3.555 -16.906** -2.746 
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Firm growth 
9.185 5.206 0.814 0.918 
 
Firm size 
-0.110 -0.315 1.216 3.407 
Brazil 
     
 
C 
-14.380 -4.601 8.234 1.009 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
0.000 -4.704 0.000 -0.892 
 
Leverage 
-4.123* -1.841 -6.010 -1.356 
 
Firm growth 
2.059 6.606 3.503 1.399 
  
Firm size 
1.651 7.394 0.109 0.179 
Panel B: ROE 
    Z-score<1.42 Z-score>2.46 
 
Variable Coefficient 
t-
Statistic Coefficient 
t-
Statistic 
China 
     
 
C 
-20.657 -0.832 -2.143 -0.147 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
63.055 3.043 14.663 1.703 
 
Leverage 
-81.242*** -5.193 -35.526*** -4.904 
 
Firm growth 
4.274 1.746 3.850 2.069 
 
Firm size 
2.907 1.831 1.280 1.372 
India 
     
 
C 
19.326 1.915 10.513 0.119 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
19.047 1.642 -193.955 -2.502 
 
Leverage 
-34.619*** -3.384 -2.903 -0.038 
 
Firm growth 
6.614 3.231 35.174 2.125 
 
Firm size 
0.166 0.270 1.851 0.353 
Russia 
     
 
C 
1.405 0.045 -38.806 -2.400 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
36.249 1.309 19.905 1.150 
 
Leverage 
-67.841** -2.577 -23.444* -1.653 
 
Firm growth 
36.932 4.132 2.123 1.040 
 
Firm size 
1.062 0.604 3.058 3.720 
Brazil 
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C 
-111.934 -4.208 -4.799 -0.246 
 
Long-term debt 
ratio 
0.000 -2.230 0.000 -0.669 
 
Leverage 
-27.124 -1.546 -34.049*** -3.142 
 
Firm growth 
7.134 3.123 4.841 0.840 
  
Firm size 
8.963 4.718 1.789 1.216 
 
The table above presents in details the link between leverage and firms with different 
financial status. The model is divided into two sub-groups, including firms with financial 
distress and financially non-distressed firms. Z-score is used to measure whether a firm is 
experiencing financial distress or not. Firms with Z-score< 1.42 are considered to be 
financially distressed firms and firms with Z-score> 2.46 are regarded as profitable firms. It 
is examined whether the impact of leverage on performance of two these groups of firms is 
similar or not.  
Panel A illustrates the impact of leverage on the subgroups, where firm performance is 
measured by ROA. In China and Russia, higher level of debt devastatingly affects firm 
performance even though these firms are experiencing difficulties in finance or not. This 
impact is considerably significant when t-statistics exceeds 2.4 in both countries in both sub-
groups. Brazil also witnesses the same vein, but at lower level of significance. India, in 
contrast, shows significant relationship between leverage and performance of firms 
experiencing financial distress while there is no link between leverage and profitable firms.  
Panel B reveals the correlation between leverage and firm performance measured by ROE. 
Similar results with Panel A are found in China, Russia and Brazil. There is a negative 
correlation between level of debt and firm performance in both sub-samples. India still shows 
the same result when debt level negatively affects performance of financially distressed 
firms, but there is no suggestion regarding link between leverage and performance of non-
distressed firms.   
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CONCLUSION  
This study investigates the homogeneity of the relationship between financial leverage and 
firm‟s efficiency across emerging economy, including Brazil, Russia, India and China 
(BRIC). The literature regarding the link between firm performance and the choice between 
debt and equity is tremendous; however, empirical evidence yields inconsistent results. 
Chaiporn Vithessonthi et al. (2015) examine the relation between financial leverage and firm 
performance in non-financial firms in Thailand during the financial crisis 2007-2009 and find 
out that leverage is negatively associated with firm performance in the full sample. 
Noticeably, they reveal that the impact of debt is negative for domestically-oriented firms but 
positive for internationally-oriented firms. Moreover, they also point out that the influence of 
leverage on performance is dependent on firm size, while there is a positive relationship for 
small firms, the opposite context is found in large firms. Silvia Z. Islam et al. (2015) also 
investigate firm leverage in Australia mining and non-mining firms and suggest that mining 
firms inclines to follow pecking order model more closely than non-mining firms. This result 
shows difference in industry does matter for firms to make debt equity choice. Hubert de La 
Bruslerie et al. (2012) also suggest that leverage decisions also are influenced by 
shareholders‟ ownership when they study 112 firms listed on French stock market over the 
period 1998-2009 and assert that there is an inverted U-shape relationship between 
shareholders‟ ownership and debt equity choice. In addition, the thesis also investigates the 
association of financial leverage with firm performance during a period of extreme distress in 
those countries. Meanwhile, Kwangmin Park et al. (2013) find that higher level of debt is an 
efficient way to reduce free cash flows and improve firm efficiency since debt leverage 
alleviates the devastating effects of unrelated diversification on firm performance. In the 
context of many controversial results around target capital structure of firms, this paper 
examines how deviations from those targets affect firm efficiency in four largest emerging 
markets, including Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) and tests whether this association 
is vulnerable under context of financial crisis, and economic downturns which is noticeably 
intriguing when considering the emerging markets since it was found that through debt 
markets the financial crisis of 2008 penetrated the emerging countries. It also provokes an 
issue concerning costs of financial distress in modern corporate finance when costs incurred 
is inability to meet firm‟s obligations, it is difficult to determine whether more debt or less 
debt is better for firm performance.  This study thus also examines the impact of financial 
leverage on performance of both distressed firms and non-distressed firms.  
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Emerging markets are always considered as promising land for business expansion compared 
with the saturation of developed markets. According to statistics from World Bank, after the 
financial crisis, the growth rates in BRIC economies have stimulated significantly and BRIC 
gradually become the driving force in the global economic recovery. Due to higher volatility 
and returns, lucrative investment opportunities, and interdependencies with developed 
markets, international investors move towards them as a good source of diversification. In 
developed markets, firms are inclined to adhere to a particular type of debt; on contrary, the 
choice of debt source in emerging markets is more flexible since firms in those economies 
may switch from public debt to private debt, which has a significant impact on choice of debt 
and equity. That in turn may create a more pronounced impact on firm performance. 
Therefore, they provide a particular interesting context for investigating the impact of choice 
of debt and equity on firm performance since the emerging markets is different from 
developed economies regarding the firm behavior towards debt financing, and volatility.  
The empirical results indicate that the leverage has a negative effect on the firm performance 
in all four countries, which implies that firms with higher level of leverage experience a loss 
in operating performance in comparison with more conservatively financed firms. Amongst 
four examined countries, the leverage has the most negative influence on its firm 
performance in India. However, interestingly, the results implicate that long-term debt has a 
positive influence on firm performance in all four countries. This can be explained that higher 
level of long-term debt forces managers to magnify the firm value and thereby alleviates 
manager discretions. Nevertheless, these effects are diminishing when firms are intensifying 
the level of debt. It asserts the existence of optimal capital structure. Regarding control 
variables, the study also shows that firm growth has slight positive impact on the firm 
performance measured by ROA in all four countries but firm size is found to affect ROA in 
only China and Brazil. When firm efficiency is measured by ROE, firm size has insignificant 
effect on the firm performance in India and Russia whereas it positively affects the corporate 
performance in China and Brazil. Russia is only the country that firm growth has a significant 
positive influence on ROE while in the other countries; there is no evidence of relationship 
between firm growth and ROE.  
Regarding the interdependence between level of debt and firm performance associated with 
economic downturns this paper provides mixed results when ROA is employed in the model. 
China and India indicate a negative relationship between leverage and firm performance, and 
this link is even more pessimistic during economic decline. Russia shows similar trend but 
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the link is insignificant.  In contrast, Brazil shows a significant positive link between level of 
debt and firm efficiency during economic deteriorate periods. This suggests, in Brazil, during 
downtrends in economy, higher level of debt facilitates better for companies. When firm 
performance is measured by ROE, the paper also observes inconsistent empirical results. 
China and India still remain to show devastating relationship between leverage and firm 
performance during recession, it however is not significant. Russia and Brazil suggest a 
contradiction in trend when higher level of debt assists firms to achieve better performance 
but this independency is also trivial with low t-statistics.  
Finally, considering the link between leverage and firms with different financial status 
measured by Z-score. This thesis illustrates the impact of leverage on the subgroups, where 
firm performance is measured by ROA. In China and Russia, higher level of debt has a 
devastating influence on firm performance even though these firms are experiencing 
difficulties in finance or not. Brazil shows similar context, but at lower level of significance. 
India, in contrast, shows significant association between debt and efficiency of firms 
experiencing financial distress while there is no link between leverage and profitable firms. 
When ROE is used as measurement for firm performance, consistent results are found in 
China, Russia and Brazil when level of debt has a negative impact on firm performance in 
both sub-samples and India remains to suggest leverage adversely affects profitability of 
financially distressed firms, but there is no suggestion regarding link between leverage and 
performance of non-distressed firms.   
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